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Abstract. Widespread interest in the emerging area of predictive an-
alytics is driving industries such as manufacturing to explore new ap-
proaches to the collection and management of data provided from In-
dustrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices. Often, analytics processing
for Business Intelligence (BI) is an intensive task, and it also presents
both an opportunity for competitive advantage as well as a security vul-
nerability in terms of the potential for losing Intellectual Property (IP).
This article explores two approaches to securing BI in the manufacturing
domain. Simulation results indicate that a Unified Threat Management
(UTM) model is simpler to maintain and has less potential vulnerabili-
ties than a distributed security model. Conversely, a distributed model of
security out-performs the UTM model and offers more scope for the use
of existing hardware resources. In conclusion, a hybrid security model
is proposed where security controls are segregated into a multi-cloud
architecture.
Keywords: Business Intelligence · security · Industrial Internet of Things
· analytics · multi-cloud.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT)[1,2,3,4,5,6] and the Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT)[7,8,9,11] is a collection of enabling technologies that can provide data-
driven visibility of physical systems. Industrial organizations, particularly those
in the manufacturing industry, make use of myriad material handling and con-
version processes that require data to control at both micro and macro levels. At
the micro level, data is an intrinsic part of a control loop to assure quality and
repeatability of the process. At the macro level, data is used to coordinate the lo-
gistics of material movements between individual processes, and manufacturing
units, for local, national and even international distribution.
As the costs associated with technology constantly reduce, and the avail-
ability of hardware platforms and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) becomes more
commonplace, more and more enterprises are installing IIoT devices to increase
the awareness of their operations[10].
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The installation of new manufacturing plant often includes the capability to
extract data about operations in real time. However, older plant does not have
such capabilities, and from a Return On Investment (ROI) perspective, there is
no justification to replace plant that is functioning satisfactorily. Thus, there is
scope for the retro-fitting of IIoT devices to plant and machinery, in order to
gain valuable insight into any potential process optimisations that might occur
as a result of having improved visibility of process data.
Once there is an IIoT infrastructure in place, where the process data can be
monitored, collected and analysed, there is range of opportunities to visualise
process data, as well as the macro level whereby collections, or even entire supply
chains can be monitored.
At the lowest level of observation, raw sensor data is collated; examples of
such data include: rotational speed; current draw; temperature; pressure; humid-
ity, and other readings of physical properties that can be converted into electrical
signals via transducers.
One phenomenon that becomes apparent with the installation of IIoT is the
considerable increase in volume of fast-moving data that has to be captured,
transported, stored and managed. Ultimately, to realise the full potential of
such data requires analysis. The addition of modelling and forecasting opera-
tions, using the data, gives rise to the emerging interest in the field of predictive
analytics.
To date, the response from enterprise software system vendors has been to
advocate high-bandwidth network upgrades, in conjunction with utility comput-
ing solutions such as cloud computing. Large organizations, who possess their
own data centres, may adopt a private or hybrid cloud approach, so that they can
increase the utilisation of resources for on-demand computational requirements.
Enterprises without such resources are then faced with the decision of whether
to acquire additional hardware via capital expenditure (CapEx), or to make use
of cloud computing (perhaps via Platform, Infrastructure or Software as a Ser-
vice) which is accounted for as an operational expenditure (OpEx).
Invariably, there is insufficient justification for enterprises to make significant
CapEx investments, especially when the same capabilities can be provided as a
service, on demand.
The adoption of analytics platforms from a remote cloud service does mean
however, that process data from the enterprise must be transported outside of the
boundaries of the organization, a prospect that is viewed with some skepticism.
There are two issues at play here. First, organizations wish to retain full con-
trol of their data, and this can only be assured by keeping data on the premises.
Second, whilst an enterprise may yet to have yielded any value from the anal-
ysis of the raw data, it is conceivable that the analysed sensor data, stored in
a cloud which is off the premises, is an obvious target for attack and therefore this
introduces a vulnerability into the security of the organization’s operations[12,13,14,15,16,17,18].
Raw data that has been processed, analysed and used to construct models of
the business, is the key source of knowledge for Business Intelligence.
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From an organization’s perspective, this data will contain valuable insight
into the detail of how raw materials are converted into products. Traditionally
this knowledge has been retained tacitly by human machine operators and man-
agers, but the adoption of IIoT equipment to sense and gather this data means
that valuable Intellectual Property (IP), that is the core of any organization’s
competitive advantage, can be managed just like any other asset.
The act of collating knowledge brings significant possibilities into being[19,20],
whilst also increasing the risks of the knowledge being lost or stolen[21,22].
Whilst a malicious employee might share the ‘secrets’ of a process that they
manage, it would be difficult to envisage how a larger security breach could be
coordinated. Conversely, a malicious attempt to attack a remote server might
provide a back door into a system that can be copied, disrupted, or even moni-
tored covertly.
Whilst one of the benefits of using a remote cloud service is that the levels
of security are of a higher grade than most small enterprises can afford, there
remains a widespread reluctance to trust systems that are remote with the core
IP of an industrial enterprise.
In the light of these challenges, this work explores how the security of IIoT-
centric BI might be augmented to increase trust between physical plant within
an organization’s premises, with the remote analytics capability that is hosted
remotely.
In particular, we propose, simulate and evaluate two models, that offer sig-
nificant improvements in security. These improvements will be of interest to
enterprises who cannot yet justify the wholesale management of IIoT analytics
management on premises, by mitigating some of the additional risks presented
by established off-premises solutions.
2 Business Intelligence services
The infrastructure of BI is a complex collection of functions that inter-operate to
consume, share and process data for reporting purposes. Data sources are varied
and include operations data from enterprise systems and sales order processing,
as well as process data for the coordination of operations activities [23].
The adoption of IIoT gives enterprises the ability to include in-process data
from manufacturing operations, increasing the scope and depth of business re-
porting that is possible. In general, transaction data is stored in relational
databases, data-marts and data warehouses, which is available for query by the
BI system [24].
As such, BI is an enhanced interface that facilitates human interaction with
the organizations’s data, leading to judgements, decisions and actions around op-
erational interventions. This important role of BI elevates its status beyond that
of traditional IT reporting infrastructure, and thus creates a greater dependency
between its users and the business.
Such is the dynamic nature of business, especially in the fast-moving manu-
facturing industry, that the requirements placed upon data usage will invariably
4 H. Al-Aqrabi et al.
change depending upon the needs of the business, whether it be from the external
environment, internal disruptions within the physical systems, or the aspirations
of the business executive.
As business requirements change, there will be a corresponding change in the
rules governing data acquisition, transformation, formatting, and finally, loading.
Each of these transactions and human interactions are opportunities for vul-
nerabilities either through human error or nefariously. Attempts to model com-
plex, multi-agency systems[25] have enabled greater understanding and com-
munication of complex human interactions with sensitive personal, in this case
health data. As a consequence, a corpus of security challenges lie in the procedu-
ral and human interactions with the BI system[24]. The work described in this
article is focused on the technical security challenges and solutions when BI is
hosted off the premises.
2.1 BI architecture
BI processes are often composed from orchestrated, collaborating services, which
are consumed by different users. In the broader domain of businesses that collect
and consume data from IIoT systems, and who have opted to utilise BI as a
service, each of the corresponding component services that constitute the overall
BI application may, in fact, request aggregated data from multiple cloud systems,
each of which may be in a different security realm.
These internal services have to be executed dynamically at runtime, and
therefore the requisite authorisation and permissions need to be in place to
allow such actions to happen.
Cloud-based systems are inherently heterogeneous in nature which necessi-
tates the automation of authorisation wherever possible, to facilitate the timely
and seamless delivery of BI services. It is a considerable technical challenge to
enable this secure collaboration.
In order to address this security challenge, an authentication framework is
required to establish trust amongst BI service instances and users by distributing
a common session secret to all participants of a session. We have addressed this
challenge by designing and implementing a secure multiparty authentication
framework for dynamic interaction, for the scenario where members of different
security realms express a need to access orchestrated services[18].
This framework exploits the relationship of trust between session members in
different security realms, to enable a user to obtain security credentials that ac-
cess cloud resources in a remote realm. The mechanism assists cloud session users
to authenticate their session membership, thereby improving the performance of
authentication processes within multiparty sessions.
We see applicability of this framework beyond multiple cloud infrastructure,
to that of any scenario where multiple security realms have the potential to
exist, such as the emerging IIoT within the manufacturing industry, commonly
referred to as an essential component of Industry 4.0[7,8,9,10].
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2.2 BI Security challenges and controls
As a business builds its BI capability, the complexity of new BI workflows in-
creases as workers begin to ask more insightful queries of their data. As such,
it can be very challenging for information and security architects to be able to
design the necessary safeguards that will enable business users to pose queries,
without hindering the potential for more complicated inquiry at a future date.
The most comprehensive BI framework requires full ownership of processes
that can access data at multiple level of granularity. Data and information
that is useful exists within all aspects of an enterprise system, including, but
not limited to: hardware and network systems; data marts and warehouses
together with associated metadata repositories; OLAP servers; the data pre-
sentation and application services layers, as well as the appropriate layers of
authentication[12,13,14]. In addition, the wholesale system augmentation of IIoT
devices adds further complexity in terms of data volume and velocity, increased
demand upon authentication services, and myriad protocols and the necessary
query brokering and routing services.
Using the basic principle that data is secure by default and only shared on
a ‘need-to-know’ basis, the authentication services apply to each generator or
collector of data within the system. It follows that the security controls are
bound to the repositories that hold both temporal and permanent data[29].
Extract, Transform and Load (ETL) functions within data marts require
this data in order to perform the correct operations on the pertinent data at
the correct time. The security controls apply both to system level and human
stakeholders, depending upon the nature of the interaction with the business
system. Some of the data will be editable, whereas other data will be permanently
stored such as financial transactions, for instance.
Multi-dimensional models for the secure management of objects within data
warehouses have been proposed[15,30,31], particularly for OnLine Analytical
Processing (OLAP) queries. In this work, there are objects that are dedicated to
the preservation of controls upon different operations within a multi-dimensional
model. Each object was invoked on a per-request basis for each transaction.
Using Object Security Constraint Language (OSCL) to extend the Unified
Modelling Language (UML), a multi-dimensional model is described. Such is
the arrangement of the data repositories, together with the tight coupling of
security control objects to the repositories, that a hierarchical organization of
the security objects also emerges.
Whilst the cohesive approach to integrating secure control objects into the
multi-dimensional data model is effective when the data domain owner is known,
instances of temporal data may not have clearly identifiable owners[16], and
therefore the argument for this approach is less convincing.
During the course of querying data for a particular purpose, it is likely that
a particular BI user requires access to data that it is not the owner of. One
example is of data streams from shopfloor manufacturing processes, that have
been fused with relevant logistics data. In this particular instance (that is very
commonplace), the data that is required does not necessarily have sufficient
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metadata to describe the constraints under which that data can be processed or
even viewed[23].
In this scenario we need to ensure that the controls that apply to intermediate
repositories of transient data will require greater security controls, than if the
data had been extracted from its source, where the domain owner of both the
owner and the requester can be ascertained through conventional authentication
mechanisms[17].
One of the trade-offs of a cohesive coupling of security objects to multidi-
mensional arrangements of repositories, is that there is an increased cost for
ETL transactions in terms of performance overhead. This is further complicated
as additional levels of abstraction are considered (for other purposes), such as
the rules engines required for OLAP processes, that are usually separated from
underlying data warehouses[19,32].
Additional real-world considerations with regard to the transport of data
within a system, especially with the integration of IIoT devices, is the likelihood
of transfer over wireless networks or hybrid/public clouds, where the underlying
infrastructure is not owned nor controlled by the organization. In such cases the
data will be encrypted after extraction, as part of the transformation process,
prior to being loaded into a repository.
So far, the discussion has explored the difficulties of implementing secure BI
workflows within manufacturing information systems. Whilst it is possible to
conceive of robust security controls, their application to the inherently compli-
cated systems that develop over time within manufacturing organizations means
that there can be a significant impact upon the performance characteristics of the
eventual system. This impact, to an extent, can be mitigated by the use of more
computing and network resources, though this requires additional investment.
However, there comes a point at which additional expenditure on infrastruc-
ture is not feasible. This point may be reached quicker with the adoption of IIoT
technologies that can rapidly overload existing network architectures with extra
data transport, a significant part of which is directly incurred as a by-product
of the additional authentication transactions for the additional physical objects,
and the associated queries that become possible as a result[33,34,35]. This is also
in addition to essential infrastructure services that invariably increase as more
equipment is added.
Figure 1 illustrates one attempt to cope with this challenge by federating
clusters of data warehouses. Each data warehouse is separated by a network
switch and associated data storage, and enables data within multiple warehouses
to be striped or depersonalised, and queried as one object[20]. The framework [20]
assigns federated repositories to separate groups of administrators. The process
of striping the data enables an element of obfuscation in that any data within
one resource is meaningless without its relevant contextual information. Such an
approach lends itself to utility computing infrastructure such as clouds, where
the elasticity of resources provides in-demand scalability.
It follows that the striped deployment of relational databases could similarly
possess elastic characteristics, and therefore any additional objects, such as for
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Fig. 1. Distributed security for a system of federated data warehouses[20].
the implementation of security controls at object-level, could be accommodated
in an architecture that scales when necessary[21].
Since this scalability can only occur where there is a proportion of redundant
infrastructure, there is a compelling case for the adoption of cloud computing,
since an organization would have on-demand access to resources that it would
otherwise have to purchase and maintain itself if hosted on the premises.
2.3 OLAP security
OLAP is a prevalent part of BI implementations, and it provides a means by
which reporting can be performed against a multi-dimensional repository. Views
of the data, referred to as ‘cubes’, enable visualization applications such as dash-
boards to present data to business users. In some cases, the BI dashboards permit
users to interact with the data cubes, either as a means to access different pre-
sentations of the data, or even to re-query the repositories to return new insight
from the underlying data stores.
An OLAP presentation contains at least a services and a user’s cube, each
of which has associated with it a set of security controls that protect the cubes
from unauthorized access to data[36].
OLAP functionality permits more complex operations to be performed on
data, in a controlled way, than would normally not be permissible, nor practi-
cal with a traditional management information system[30]. The granular control
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of this extended functionality is administered by a series of OLAP operations,
themselves being constrained by a Multi-Dimensional Security Constraint Lan-
guage (MDSCL)[24]. Figure 2 illustrates the security controls to restrict view
operations. As the business users create queries, via the BI architectural concept
Fig. 2. Distributed security controls in an OLAP cube comprising viewing and opera-
tions restrictions.
of a cube, the system associates the appropriate logical access and operation
execution controls as befits the outcomes that the user desires. These controls
form part of a library of controls that can then be re-purposed to apply to future
cubes as new queries are generated.
Business users can then access the controls via instances of cubes, typically
as part of a query modelling process carried out by the users [30] or system
administrators.
Since the OLAP organization facilitates the creation and customization of
different views of the data, it is important to ensure that inadvertent access is
not granted to unauthorized users, in order that the privacy of both users, users’
access to data, and the data itself is preserved.
The Secure Distributed-OLAP aggregation Protocol (SDO) is a means by
which such privacy can be assured. Using SDO, the owners of views of multi-
dimensional queries can be secured and logged. This enables the control and
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prevention of unauthorized access as described above, and manages the data that
is held about a user, their permissions and the details about their interactions
with data objects[31].
These ‘privacy metrics’[36] will be hierarchical in structure [32], and reflect
detailed signatures of users’ interactions, in relation to the sensitivity of the data,
as well as the originating privacy criteria of the repositories[36], through their
interactions with the various cubes. The result of this is that details of the users
are then stored in a log for future analysis.
A variation of this proposal[22] provides the introduction of further con-
trols (and overhead) to manage constraints on the OLAP cubes and underlying
repositories. By the augmentation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Sys-
tems (IDPS) into the scheme, requests made to repositories can be marshalled
as an additional layer of protection against unauthorized access.
Similarly, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a means by
which access to services on a network can be managed through an authenti-
cation mechanism. At a lower level, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols can
also be utilised to ensure that interactions within objects are transacted via an
encrypted exchange[22].
This has been a considerable challenge for the research community for some
time now. There appears to be a preference for security mechanisms that are dis-
tributed across systems, with individualised controls at object level. In contrast,
the Unified Threat Management framework (UTM) approach considers the sys-
tem as a whole entity that must be protected as such and requires centralized
governance.
Conceptually a distributed approach is more resilient to nefarious attacks;
however the practicality of managing such a system is far more challenging than
a centralized governance model. In addition, there is the potential to optimize
and streamline the effect of controls upon system resources when it is centrally
administered, whereas the more flexible, object-level security controls, present a
potentially greater load upon network infrastructure through the greater volume
of authentication activity for a given task.
However, the emergence of IIoT, and the awareness that systems need to be
designed and built to scale elastically in the future, is also generating enthusiasm
for cloud-provisioned resources and approaches to software development such
as Microservices Architectures (MA)[37]. We have attempted to approach the
modelling of this situation by recognising that a manufacturing organization will
want to adopt IIoT devices in a fluid and scalable way, and have adopted good
practice for the modelling of networks that may include mobile sensors and other
entities as advocated by[38].
In reality, the limit of computing resource is constrained either by physical
infrastructure, or via the costs associated with a utility computing provision,
so there is a need to understand the implications of each of these approaches,
in order for organizations to ascertain the most appropriate approach. To date,
there is no evidence of such a comparison, which has given rise to the work
described in this article.
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We describe the modelling and simulation of both a UTM approach versus
a distributed approach to security, in the context of the manufacturing domain
where IIoT devices are included as part of the system. Since there is a need for
rapid allocation, de-allocation and re-allocation of resources, we have adopted a
cloud-centric model, though this does not in itself necessitate an off-the-premises
solution.
3 Description of the Models
Since the UTM approach is centralized, it is logical to group security controls
into the following layers: network, transport, session and presentation. For the
distributed approach, application layer security is appropriate, utilizing each of
the components within the infrastructure.
Both scenarios have been modelled in OPNET. Model A uses a UTM cloud
within a demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to contain the security components that are
required to govern the whole system. All connection requests to the BI applica-
tion are marshalled via the UTM cloud.
In contrast, Model B has no requirement for a UTM cloud as the security
components have been distributed at object level, hence all connection requests
are made directly to the object that is to be invoked, via appropriate object-
specific security controls. Both approaches are illustrated in Figure 3. OPNET
Fig. 3. a) Unified Threat Management (UTM) model; b) Distributed security model.
allows the creation of bespoke application configurations, which includes the
ability to assign them to different resources (in this case servers) according to
the role that is played within the overall system.
For example, the OLAP DASHBOARDS, DW DM, and OLAP VIEWS are all repre-
sented by OPNET profiles, and are assigned within the BI application and
database cloud in Model A (UTM model). The remainder of the controls re-
side within the UTM cloud in the DMZ.
Since the UTM cloud (and DMZ) is not present in Model B (distributed
security model), the entirety of the roles are undertaken by the BI application
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(via OLAP) and database (in this case a data warehouse) servers within the BI
cloud. Therefore, Model B has the role of security distributed across all the ap-
plication and database servers, embedding the marshalling at object level. Model
A’s centralisation of security roles into a separate security domain contrasts with
the distributed approach of Model B.
3.1 Model A: Unified Threat Management approach
Figure 4 illustrates the BI system which is composed of two server arrays. The
BI on cloud (comprising of application servers and database servers) has been
modelled employing four different arrays. There is an array of five OLAP servers
connected to cloud switch 2, an array of four database servers connected to
cloud switch 1, another array of four database servers connected to cloud switch
3 and an array of four high-end Cisco switches (Cisco 6509 routing switches).
The two sets of database server arrays have been presented to model the concept
of splitting records between two hardware clusters. Each of the databases that
Fig. 4. The BI server arrays forming a cloud infrastructure.
stores the temporal and permanent data are represented by the DW DM servers.
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OLAP applications are hosted on server arrays, including both the applications
and the view cubes. Server connectivity is provided via simulated Cisco 7000
switches. Figure 5 illustrates the security components contained within the DMZ.
Fig. 5. Security components within the Unified Threat Management cloud.
Each user session is directed through a zone based firewall, which isolates
all user sessions and prevents them from accessing the cloud switches directly
without the appropriate authority. All user sessions are forwarded to the UTM
switch.
Source and destination rules for each client and server have been created to
inform the simulation as to which client and server is the target for a particular
request. This feature within OPNET had been employed to create complex traffic
flows between clients (representing users) and the relevant cloud servers.
The destination servers for the clients (in the extranet domain of BI users)
are the servers with various security roles in this DMZ, and the cloud OLAP
servers are in turn the destination servers for these DMZ based security servers.
The traffic is now strictly rule-based, an approach that is an established method
amongst the body of research work in this area.
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The RDBMS security monitor holds all the rules deployed for ETL processes,
and others are regular security servers. The LDAP server is deployed as a reference
database of all user accounts. Hence, the RDBMS security monitor has a destina-
tion rule pointing towards this server and this server, in turn points towards the
cloud servers.
3.2 Model B: Distributed security model
Model B is presented in Figure 3. As described earlier, the security components
are integrated with the BI servers in the cloud-based arrays, and all client re-
quests are made directly upon the cloud switches. Since the centralized UTM
cloud is absent in Model B, the necessary security components and services have
been embedded within the OLAP, database and data warehouse servers as fol-
lows:
– BI DW DM: the data warehouse and data marts servers;
– BI Application: OLAP apps servers;
– BI Security UTM: all security services are enabled on each server.
This represents the concept of distributing embedded security controls, as advo-
cated by the research community. The application destination preferences have
been directed towards the OLAP application servers, which in turn have their
destination preferences as the data warehouse and data mart servers.
4 Results
In this section, the simulation results of the two approach are presented, together
with a discussion about the relative efficacy of each approach to security.
4.1 Performance
For Model A, the average response time to database queries across the entire
network exceeds 20 seconds, and the average HTTP object response time can
take up to 3 seconds.TCP delays are in excess of 20 seconds, with TCP seg-
ment delays of 4 seconds. The TCP retransmission count exceeded 1000 on two
occasions.
All the user traffic is being routed through the security services servers in the
UTM cloud. The users are connected to a zone-based firewall, which routes their
traffic to the security servers. With this configuration, there are two hops from
user workstations to the BI application servers on the cloud. In this arrangement,
the capacity may not be an issue, but the routing of traffic through the servers
placed in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is adding a delay component onto all
of the servers.
The performance report of Model B is presented in Figure 7. In this model,
the performance is within the expected limits and there are no TCP delays, TCP
segment delays and TCP retransmissions. We observed that the performance of
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Fig. 6. Performance of Model B.
database query response and HTML page/object responses is superior to Model
A and is satisfactory from a users perspective. The response times returned in
this model are as expected from a cloud hosted BI application. Removal of the
UTM cloud layer has ensured that all the session bottlenecks in the network
are eliminated. User sessions are served by the BI cloud based server arrays for
application requests and for the security sessions as well. The load of the security
sessions are distributed amongst all servers in the OLAP and data warehouse
arrays given that the databases serving the security applications will also be
partitioned and spread across the servers.
Massively parallel processing models[24] hold for security services as well.
This is essentially a practical form of implementing the distributed embedded
security components recommended by the research community as evident from
the literature review.
As the trend towards service distribution and embedded computation con-
tinues, is is conceivable that a UTM cloud owner may increase the number of
significantly large sized arrays of servers, and then partition all security related
databases to produce a massively parallel system. In such a scenario, a UTM
might be the first choice for a system architect. Innovative methods are emerg-
ing for the meta scheduling of multi-cloud instances, in a bid to counter the
increased complexity of balancing resource efficiency against the need to provide
an acceptable level of service[26,27].
However, whilst the performance at the UTM cloud will definitely improve,
network and session layer congestion cannot be reduced. This is because the
system will be a cascade of two large clouds, and the cascade itself will be a
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Fig. 7. Performance of Model B.
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bottleneck. The effects of a massively parallel database query-distribution system
will create difficulties when two large arrays are cascaded by the joining of two
clouds.
This limitation will exist when two clouds are interconnected and the user
sessions will be allowed to pass through one cloud to the server arrays of another.
Performance will improve when the users are allowed to connect to two clouds
independently for different purposes, and there is no inter-cloud cascade. How-
ever, such a system will not be effective from security point of view, because the
user sessions need to pass through a common checkpoint before being allowed
to access application resources.
We must also consider that the demands being placed upon BI applications
are continuing to stretch performance as users derive new insight from innova-
tive applications, such as automated object-tracking from video stream data[28],
which is finding many applications in the manufacturing domain.
4.2 Security efficacy
Model A incorporates both a UTM and DMZ, which are well proven security
concepts, whereas the distributed approach of Model B is yet to be proven to
the same degree. To summarise:
1. For Model A, each user is marshalled to the BI application via the DMZ. In
Model B, users connect directly to the BI application components.
2. Cyber attacks into a Model A arrangement are faced with only one secure
entry point to overcome. Again, for Model B there are multiple potential
vulnerabilities that will increase as more components and devices are added
to the system over time;
3. Security updates and maintenance is a constant requirement that will be
managed via the UTM cloud in Model A. For Model B, this results in a very
challenging environment whereby the security responsibilities of components
are individualized.
However, Model A suffers from performance related issues. Close scrutiny of the
simulation results shows that UTM DB ACT MON is generating maximum traffic, a
cause of the performance degradation.
The Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS) approach via a UMT cloud is attractive
to adopt as user sessions pass through the UTM zone-based firewall, whereas
user sessions directly hit the cloud servers in the distributed security model
(Model B). In addition, security administration is much easier than the dis-
tributed model.
However, the issue of security vulnerability through the multiple entry points
within Model B could be addressed by the use of a cloud server to prevent an
adversarial attack, by marshalling and containing the attack, whilst maintaining
the integrity of the overall system.
Thus, we feel that a hybrid configuration of models would offer considerable
potential, balancing performance requirements without jeopardizing security ef-
ficacy. All application security controls can be embedded (Model B approach),
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whereas the network, transport, and session security can be incorporated in the
DMZ (Model A approach). This segregation of security roles will offer the po-
tential of delivering the users’ requirements.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
The performance of Model B is superior to that of Model A. This is because
there is an additional overhead of a DMZ cloud in Model A with rule-based
traffic forwarded through multiple hops of servers. Every hop added in between
causes a delay that is reflected in the simulation results.
In contrast, there is only one hop between users and cloud servers in Model
B, and there are no forwarding rules (because every server acts as a security
node, as well).
For Model B, the performance is within the expected limits and there are no
TCP delays, TCP segment delays and TCP re-transmissions. It is observed that
the performance of database query response, HTML page and object responses
is improved over Model A, and is satisfactory from the users perspective. The
response times returned in this model are as expected from a cloud hosting
of BI. Elimination of the UTM cloud layer has ensured that all of the session
bottlenecks in the network are eliminated.
Hence, a combined model with application security embedded on the BI
cloud, with the rest deployed in the UTM cloud, may be an optimum solution,
both in terms of performance and effectiveness of security controls. In such a
mixed model, the security controls will be technically sound with appropriate
positioning of security layers, better security processes, clearly defined roles and
accountabilities (application security and network security), and better effective-
ness of controls.
Additional research is required to assess how such a hybrid model of BI secu-
rity on the cloud can be implemented, and is the mandate for this research going
forward. In particular, we are investigating how traditional security components
(like those shown in the Model A DMZ) can be implemented in the form of cloud
arrays in distributed architectures.
References
1. Ashton, K.: That “Internet of Things” thing, RFiD Journal, (2009).
2. Gubbi, J., Buyya, R., Marusic, S., Palaniswami, M.: Internet of Things (IoT): A
vision, architectural elements, and future directions. Future generation computer
systems, 29(7), pp1645-1660, (2013).
3. Chen, F., Deng, P., Wan, J., Zhang, D., Vasilakos, A., Rong, X.: Data mining for
the Internet of things: Literature review and challenges, International Journal of
Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 11, no. 8, (2015).
4. Gartner, “Gartner Says 6.4 Billion Connected Things? Will Be
in Use in 2016, Up 30 Percent From 2015?’, Gartner website,
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317, 10th November, (2015).
18 H. Al-Aqrabi et al.
5. Ikram, A., Anjum, A., Hill, R., Antonopoulos, N., Liu, L., Sotiriadis, S.: Approaching
the Internet of things (IoT): a modelling, analysis and abstraction framework. Con-
currency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 27(8), pp1966-1984, (2015).
6. Sundmaeker, H., Guillemin, P., Friess, P., Woelffle´, S.: Vision and challenges for
realising the Internet of Things, Cluster of European Research Projects on the
Internet of Things, CERP IoT, (2010).
7. PWC, Industry 4.0: building the digital enterprise,
http://www.pwc.com/industry40, (2016).
8. Wang, S., Wan, J., Zhang, D., Li, D. Zhang, C.: Towards the smart factory for Indus-
trie 4.0: A self-organized multi-agent system assisted with big data based feedback
and coordination, Computer Networks, Elsevier, vol. 101, pp.158-168, (2016).
9. Wang, S., Wan, J., Li, D., Zhang, C.: Implementing smart factory of industrie
4.0: An outlook, International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks., vol. 12, 1,
(2016).
10. Hill, M., Devitt, J., Anjum, A., Ali, M.: Towards In-Transit Analytics for Industry
4.0. FCST2017, IEEE Computer Society, (2017).
11. Liu, Q., Wan, J., Zhou, K.: Cloud manufacturing service system for industrial-
cluster-oriented application, Journal of Internet Technology, vol. 15, no. 3, pp.373-
380, (2014).
12. Katic, N., Quirchmayr, G., Schiefer, J., Stolba, M., Tjoa, A M.: A Prototype
Model for Data Warehouse Security Based on Metadata. University of Vienna: pp1-
9, (2006).
13. Rosenthal, R., Sciore, E.: View Security as the Basis for Data Warehouse Security.
In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design and Management of Data
Warehouses (DMDW’2000), (M. Jeusfeld, H. Shu, M. Staudt, G. Vossen, eds.),
Stockholm, Sweden, June 5-6, pp1-8, (2000).
14. Kadan, A.: Security Management of Intelligent Technologies in Business Intelli-
gence Systems, Yanka Kupala State University of Grodno: pp1-3, (2012).
15. Fernandez-Medinaa, E., Trujillo, J., Villarroel, R., Piattini, M.: Developing secure
data warehouses with a UML extension, Information Systems, 32: pp826856, (2007).
16. Ahmad, S., Ahmad, R.: An Improved Security Framework for Data Warehouse: A
Hybrid Approach. IEEE: pp1586-1590.
17. Brankovic, L., Estivill-Castro, V.: Privacy issues in knowledge discovery and data
mining. Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, The University
of Newcastle, Australia, pp1-12, (2000).
18. Al-Aqrabi, H., Liu, L., Hill, R., Antonopoulos, N.: Taking the Business Intelligence
to the Clouds. 9th International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems
(HPCC-ICESS), Liverpool, IEEE Computer Society, pp953-958, (2012).
19. Blanco, C., Prez-Castillo, R., Hernndez, A., Fernndez-Medina, E., and Trujillo,
J.: Towards a Modernization Process for Secure Data Warehouses. T.B. Pedersen,
M.K. Mohania, and A M. Tjoa (Eds.), LNCS 5691: pp2435, Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, (2009).
20. Stobla, N., Banek, M., Tjoa, A. M.: The Security Issue of Federated Data Ware-
houses in the Area of Evidence-Based Medicine. Vienna University of Technology
and University of Zagreb, pp1-11.
21. Abadi, D. J.: Data Management in the cloud: Limitations and Opportunities. Data
Engineering, Vol. 32 (1): pp3-11, IEEE Computer Society, (2009).
22. Fienberg, S. E.: Privacy and Confidentiality in an e-Commerce World: Data Min-
ing, Data Warehousing, Matching and Disclosure Limitation. Statistical Science, 21
(2): pp143154, Institute of mathematical Statistics, (2006).
Securing Manufacturing Intelligence for the Industrial Internet of Things 19
23. Al-Aqrabi, H., Liu, L., Hill, R., Antonopoulos, N.: A Multi-layer Hierarchical Inter-
Cloud Connectivity Model for Sequential Packet Inspection of Tenant Sessions Ac-
cessing BI as a Service. Proceedings of 6th International Symposium on Cyberspace
Safety and Security (CSS) and IEEE 11th International Conference on Embedded
Software and Systems (ICESS). pp137-144. IEEE, France, Paris (2014).
24. Al-Aqrabi, H., Liu, L., Hill, H., Cui, L., Li, J.: Faceted Search in Business Intelli-
gence on the Cloud. in Proceedings of GREENCOM-ITHINGS-CPSCOM, pp842-
849. IEEE, China, Beijing (2013).
25. Beer, M., Huang, W., Hill, R.: Designing community care systems with AUML.
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer, Communication and
Control Technologies (CCCT ‘03) and the 9th International Conference on Infor-
mation Systems Analysis and Synthesis (ISAS ‘03), Orlando, USA, July 31-August
2, IEEE Computer Society, pp247-253, (2003).
26. Sotiriadis, S., Bessis, N., Antonopoulos, N., Hill, R.: Meta-scheduling algorithms
for managing inter-cloud interoperability. International Journal of High Performance
Computing and Networking, 7(2), pp.156-172, (2013).
27. Sotiriadis, S., Bessis, N., Anjum, A., Buyya, R.: An inter-cloud meta-scheduling
(icms) simulation framework: Architecture and evaluation. IEEE Transactions on
Services Computing (2015).
28. Yaseen, M.U., Anjum, A., Rana, O., Hill, R.: Cloud-based scalable object detection
and classification in video streams, Future Generation Computer Systems, ISSN
0167-739X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2017.02.003, (2017).
29. Farhan, M.S., Marie, M.E., El-Fangary, L.M., and Helmy, Y.K.: Transforming Con-
ceptual Model into Logical Model for Temporal Data Warehouse Security: A Case
Study, International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 3
(3): pp115-122, (2012).
30. Priebe, T., Pernul, G.:Towards OLAP Security Design Survey and Research Issues.
In: Proceedings of Third ACM International Workshop on Data Warehousing and
OLAP (DOLAP 2000), November 10, 2000, McLean, VA, USA, pp33-40. ACM,
(2000).
31. Cuzzocrea, A., Bertino, E., Sacca, D.: Towards a Theory for Privacy Preserving
Distributed OLAP. In: PAIS12, March 30, 2012, Berlin, Germany, pp. 1-6, ACM,
(2012).
32. Agrawal, R., Srikant, R., Thomas, D.: Privacy Preserving OLAP. In: SIGMOD
2005, June 14-16, 2005, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, pp1-12, ACM, (2005).
33. Shu, Z., Wan, J., Zhang, D., Li, D.: Cloud-integrated cyber-physical systems for
complex industrial applications, Mobile Network Applications, pp.1-14, (2015).
34. Li, X., Li, D., Wan, J., Vasilakos, A., Lai, C., Wang, S.: A review of industrial
wireless networks in the context of industry 4.0, Wireless Networks, pp.1-19, (2015).
35. Baker, C., Anjum, A., Hill, R., Bessis, N., Liaquat Kiani, S.: Improving cloud
datacentre scalability, agility and performance using OpenFlow. Proceedings of the
4th International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems
(INCoS), IEEE Computer Society, (2012).
36. Wang, L., Jajodia, S., Wijesekera, D.: Securing OLAP Data Cubes Against Privacy
Breaches”, In: Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P04), pp1-15, IEEE Computer Society, (2004).
37. Shadija, D., Rezai, M., Hill, R.: Towards an understanding of microservices, 23rd
International Conference on Automation and Computing (ICAC), Huddersfield, UK.
IEEE Computer Society, DOI: 10.23919/IConAC.2017.8082018, 2017.
20 H. Al-Aqrabi et al.
38. Garcia-Campos, J.M., Reina, D.G., Toral, S.L., Bessis, N., Barrero, F., Asi-
makopoulou, E., Hill, R.: Performance evaluation of reactive routing protocols for
VANETs in urban scenarios following good simulation practices, In: 2015 9th In-
ternational Conference on Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous
Computing (IMIS), Santa Cantarina, Brazil, July 8-10, ISBN: 978-1-4799-8872-3,
pp.1-8, (2015). DOI: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/IMIS.2015.5
